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I.

INTRODUCTION

Any understanding or review of adoption law in the United
States, and in Minnesota in particular, must begin with a
recognition that adoption law by its very nature is a melding of
social and ethical views of society with respect to children, with
prevailing legal complexities and attitudes. The legal decisions
made in adoption cases and described in State and Federal statutes
must, of necessity, involve consideration of “children’s best
1
interests.” That consideration of societal views of children and
† Wright S. Walling graduated from the University of Minnesota Law
School in 1972. He is a founding partner of the law firm of Walling, Berg &
Debele, P.A. He is a past President of the American Academy of Adoption
Attorneys and a 2004 winner of the Angels in Adoption award from the
Congressional Coalition on Adoption. Mr. Walling currently serves on the Board
of Directors of the North American Council on Adoptable Children. He focuses
his practice in all areas of juvenile and family law.
1. See source cited infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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legal principles goes well beyond the question of legal and statutory
interpretation, involving implications as well as reflections of how
society decides to view its children and to create and define
families. It reflects society’s view of how families are created, how
they are disciplined, how they are maintained, and how they are
defined.
This reflection of the melding of issues involving law and
society requires only the view of the attempts by various
practitioners to define their role in the adoption process. These
attitudes are reflected on one side by the Code of Ethics of the
2
American Academy of Adoption Attorneys and on the other side
3
by the Standards issued by the Child Welfare League of America.
By comparing these approaches, one can see the continuing
struggle and simmering tension between the two worlds of law and
social work.
Given the complexity of the broader societal context in which
adoption practice now occurs, it is especially important to reaffirm
the fundamental values that provide a framework for professional
adoption services.
The core values listed below form the
foundation for the ethical development and delivery of adoption
services.
•

All children have a right to receive care, protection,
and love.

•

The family is the primary means by which children are
provided with the essentials for their well-being.

•

The birth family constitutes the preferred means of
providing family life for children.

•

When adoption is the plan for a child, the extended
family should be supported as the first option for
adoption placement, if appropriate.

2. American Academy of Adoption Attorneys, Code of Ethics, in FAMILIES BY
LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 43, 43–44 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger
eds., 2004), available at http://www.adoptionattorneys.org/information/ethics_
code.htm.
3. Child Welfare League of America, Adoption as a Child Welfare Service: CWLA
2000 Standards, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 45, supra note 2, at 45–46.
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•

Adoption as a child welfare service should be focused
on meeting the needs of the children to be become full
and permanent members of families.

•

All children are adoptable.

•

Siblings should be placed together in adoption unless
serious reasons necessitate their separation.

•

Adoption is a life long experience that has a unique
impact on all the parties involved.

•

Adoption should validate and assist children in
developing their individual, cultural, ethnic, and racial
identity, and should enhance their self-esteem. All
adoption services should be based on principles of
respect,
honesty,
self-determination,
informed
decision-making, and open communication.

•

All applicants for services should be treated in a fair
4
and non discriminatory manner.

While the above summary of the Child Welfare League of
America Standards of Excellence in Adoption Services may reflect
some departure from previous adoption standards, these standards
nevertheless continue to state the commitment by the social service
professionals as to what they determine to be in the “child’s best
interests.” At the same time, approaching it from a more legalistic
standpoint, and in an attempt also to provide services deemed to be
in the “children’s best interests” and supportive of adoptions, the
American Academy of Adoption Attorneys has established its code
of ethics as follows:
The American Academy of Adoption Attorneys hereby
make and establish this Code of Ethics.
1. A Member shall be duly licensed to practice law in each
state in which the Member maintains a law office, shall
fully comply with the Ethical and [other Rules and
Canons] of Professional Conduct . . . and shall maintain
the highest standards of professional and ethical conduct.
4.

Id.
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A Member shall not engage in activities which bring
discredit upon the Academy.
2. (a) A Member shall assure that the Member’s clients
are aware of their legal rights and obligations in the
adoption, and that all parties to the adoption are aware of
their right to separate legal counsel. . . .
3. A Member shall not purport to represent both the
prospective adopting parent(s) and one or both birth
parents, where such representation is specifically
prohibited. . . .
4. A Member shall actively discourage adoption fraud or
misrepresentation, and shall not engage in such conduct,
and shall take all reasonable measures not inconsistent
with the confidentiality of the attorney/client
relationship,
to
prevent
adoption
fraud
or
misrepresentation, withdrawing from representation
where necessary to avoid participation in any such
conduct.
5. (a) A Member shall assure that clients to an adoption
are aware of any laws which govern permissible financial
assistance to a birth parent.
(b) A Member shall not assist or cooperate in any
adoption in which the Member has reason to believe that
the birth parent or parents are being paid, or given
anything of value, in exchange for the placement for
adoption, for the consent to an adoption, for
relinquishment for adoption, or for cooperation with the
adoption of his or her child, without first making full
disclosure to the appropriate court. This rule does not
make it improper for a Member to assist or cooperate with
an adoption in which the birth parent or parents are
reimbursed for reasonable and necessary pregnancyrelated expenses actually incurred by the birth parent, or
in which such expenses are paid directly on behalf of the
birth parent, provided that such payment or
reimbursement is allowed under the [state] law. . . .
6. A Member shall assure that the Member’s fee
arrangement with each client is carefully explained and
fully understood by the client. . . .
7. A Member shall not enter into an agreement for,
charge, or collect an illegal or unconscionable fee . . .
[and] shall not, directly or indirectly, charge a finder’s fee
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for locating a birth parent. . . .
8. A Member shall not possess a financial stake in the
success of any adoption in which the Member is retained
as counsel for any party. A financial stake in an adoption
[occurs] if the Member enters into a fee agreement by
which the Member is to receive a greater fee for a
successful adoption than is warranted based upon the
reasonable value of the services performed by the
Member; or . . . a lesser fee than the reasonable value of
the services performed by the Member if the attempted
adoption is unsuccessful. . . .
10. A Member shall not make false or misleading claims in
advertisements, nor shall a Member include client
testimonials in such advertising. . . .
11. . . . (b) A Member shall not induce or encourage a
birth parent to change selection of prospective adopting
parents unless the Member knows or has reason to believe
that the proposed adopting parents cannot obtain court
approval of a placement with them.
12. A Member shall not enter into any agreement with any
person which would have the effect of restricting the
Member’s ability to exercise independent professional
judgment on behalf of the Member’s clients.
13. A Member may, when appropriate and/or when
requested by a client, refer parties to competent and
professional
medical
providers,
legal
counsel,
psychological counselors, or adoption agencies. . . .
14. A Member shall be under a duty to investigate
representations made to the Member by prospective birth
parents and prospective adopting parents if the Member
believes or has reason to believe that such representation
is false.
[E.g., a birth mother’s claims about the
whereabouts or name of the biological father.] Under all
other circumstances, a Member may ethically rely upon
5
representations made by the parties to an adoption.
“Adoption is a legal proceeding whereby the parent-child
relationship is created between the person or married couple
6
adopting . . . and the person being adopted . . . .” Despite this fact,

5.
6.

American Academy of Adoption Attorneys, supra note 2, at 43–44.
Golda Zimmerman, What Is Adoption—Overview, in ADOPTION LAW:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 3 (Golda Zimmerman ed., 2004).
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there is an overlap in the relationship between the legal
proceedings and the commitment to children through the social
services that cannot be avoided.
Further, while it is true that “[a]doptions in the United States
7
exist strictly according to statute, in derogation of common law,” it
is also true that the interpretation of those statutes is usually done
within the context of an attempt to do what is in the “children’s
best interests.”
Despite the attempts of many to reflect, in statutory and case
law determinations, the views of society,
[i]t can be said that the state of the law is often behind
what is currently happening in society and science, and
what are common or acceptable patterns of behavior.
This belief is particularly true when one takes a current
assessment of the practice and procedures of adoption law
in the 21st Century. Issues such as assisted reproduction
technology, adoption facilitators, adoption mediation,
and gay and lesbian adoption are not adequately
8
addressed by statute, if addressed at all.
It is this constant tension between the changing attitudes and
views of society toward its children and families and the strict
construction of statutory law that continue to demonstrate that
“[a]doption is a complicated area of the law and legal errors can
9
result in devastating consequences.”
In addition to the ongoing tension and conflict between
statutory interpretation and the slowness of statutes to reflect
changing societal attitudes, the reality of adoption law exists as the
result of the numerous differences in the population of adopted
children available. In most cases, adoption statutes in all states,
including Minnesota, are consistent and do not reflect on their face
a difference in the children to be adopted. Nevertheless, most
statutory provisions have resulted from considerations of specific
children available for adoption. In general, those populations can
be divided into two groups. The first group consists of children
who are infants or children under the age of two. Those children
may be coming from single mothers, intact families, foreign
countries, or, in some unusual cases, through the Child Welfare

7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
AMY M. SILBERBERG, MINNESOTA ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (1999).
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10

System. The second group consists of those children who have
been involuntarily removed from their families of origin by the
State and, as a result of the need for permanency in their lives after
removal, are available for adoption. In most cases, those children
have been the subject of significant abuse or neglect, have had one
or more placements in foster care, and are generally older
11
children, often involved in sibling groups.
Both of these separate categories of children have different
needs and are viewed differently by society in general and adoption
statutes in particular.
This article will focus on historical developments of adoption
12
law in Minnesota and, briefly, nationally. This article then offers
13
analysis of selected areas of adoption law, and ends with
descriptions of expectations for future developments in adoption
14
law.
II. THE GENERAL HISTORY OF ADOPTION
Adoption as a concept, and specifically as a legal concept, is in
many ways a uniquely American creation. As the Progressive
Movement of the late nineteenth century merged with changing
views of children and families, all states eventually created adoption
statutes, attempting in many ways to create better situations for
15
families.
As the more specific description of the history of
16
Minnesota statutes in the next section shows, the statutes changed
over time in their continuing attempt to reflect the ever-shifting
views of society toward children and families. But at every point,
there was an ongoing attempt by those involved in the various
welfare societies, as well as the state, to do what they thought was in
“children’s best interests.”
This often included the movement of children from what were
viewed as the poverty areas of the large cities on the east coast out
to the farms and rural areas in the Midwest. There were, in fact,
10. See generally MINN. STAT. § 259.47 (2006) (dealing previously with the
placement of infants).
11. See generally Id. § 259.29, subdiv. 2 (dealing previously with the placement
of older children with relatives of kin).
12. See infra Parts II, III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See BARBARA MELOSH, STRANGER AND KIN: THE AMERICAN WAY OF ADOPTION
15 (2002).
16. See infra Part III.
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requests by various persons in the Midwest for children. In the
early 1920s, the following notice appeared in Outlook, a nationally
circulated magazine directed at social workers and reformers:
Desirable home is available for boy of seven or eight with
superior mentality and healthy heredity. Family consists
of university graduates, and child would receive skillful
attention in respect to health and education, including
music if desirable, also college and professional training
17
later. Neighborhood and general environment the best.
In 1918, the Mayor of Bogalusa, Louisiana, wrote the
Children’s Aid Society of New York to request
some white babies . . . a car load . . . by a car load, mean
about thirty to fifty. We do not care to know anything
about their antecedents or parentage. All we want to
know is that they are healthy. We would be interested in
about one half Protestant and one half Catholic children,
18
both boys and girls.
These two examples reflected a competing view of family and
child placement characteristics in the early stages of adoption.
This period reflected a transitional moment in the history of
adoption. What has been referred to as “instrumental adoption”
was a kind of adoption in which older children were far more
desirable than infants, who were consequently rarely the subject of
19
this type of adoption. Instrumental adoption was influenced by
concepts of apprenticeship and was based on a calculus concerning
20
the worth of a child’s labor.
By the early twentieth century, however, many people began to
turn to adoption in search of children to cherish, throwing away
consideration of their economic value. At that point, “sentimental
adoption” was developed and was predicated not on economic
value but on the sense of the child’s emotional value to the parents
21
and to the family.
The earlier economic view of children as essentially “chattel” is
clear in the request from Louisiana:
The Mayor’s letter suggests the persistence of older forms
of child exchange. His letter addressed the Children’s

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

MELOSH, supra note 15, at 12.
Id.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
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Aid Society of New York. Under the leadership of Charles
Lowery Brace, that organization collected children from
the city’s streets to transport them to the supposedly more
salubrious environs of midwestern farms. Begun in the
mid-1850s, these orphan trains had fallen into disrepute
by 1918. Progressive-era reformers instead turned to
“home relief,” that is, keeping children within their
original families and caring for them in their homes. The
mayor’s request for a “carload” of “thirty to fifty” children
was strikingly at odds with emerging new middle-class
models of childhood: his casual quantification seemed to
posit children as readily exchangeable surplus
commodities, an affront to the sentimentality and
emotion associated with childhood.
Moreover, the
22
unsavory whiff of apprenticeship clings to his letter.
The observation by the Mayor of a concern for the health of
the children seems to imply the expectation that they will be put to
work on the farms, a characteristic of the “instrumental family” that
was being assaulted by reformers who agitated for child labor laws
23
Nevertheless, in his request for
and compulsory schooling.
“babies,” there is also an indication of a desire for children too
young to work, reflecting the beginnings of changes in attitudes
24
toward adoption itself.
More strongly reflecting the changes in attitudes,
[t]he Outlook announcement, written just a few years later,
implies a very different world of child nurture and family.
In sharp contrast to the Mayor’s order of a job lot of
healthy children, these petitioners seek one particular
child, meticulously specified by sex, age, intelligence, and
inheritance. If these petitioners are far choosier about
the child they seek, they are also far more concerned to
present their own credentials as parents. Saying nothing
about religion, they offer as inducements the material and
cultural advantage of the middle-class life. The two
documents reveal radically different assessments of the
economy of adoption. The Mayor assumes that the
Children’s Aid Society has large numbers of children on
hand, ready to be distributed for the asking. The Outlook
notice, in contrast, implies an economy of scarcity. The
[prospective] adopters, or whoever is writing on their
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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behalf, have resorted to national advertising to find a
25
single child.
While the first adoption law was actually passed in 1851 in
Massachusetts, this and earlier laws were actually directed primarily
26
at the regulation of inheritance. Even as they did, in fact, create a
legal relationship between the adoptive parents and the children,
they specifically made provisions for bequests to those outside the
circle of blood kinship and also explicitly defended the rights of
27
biological heirs.
By contrast, the evolving institution of adoption in the
twentieth century made adoptive families in the United
States the full legal equivalent of families formed by
biology.
In some times and places, adoption had
established a new relationship between adults. In the
United States, adoption meant child adoption, and by
decree of adoption, biological strangers became legal and
28
social kin.
As noted,
[a]doption was crafted in the context of Progressive
reform and modernizing culture, as the religious and
moral commitments of Victorianism yielded to the new
understandings of social and behavioral science. The
emergence of modern adoption required a radically
different understanding of family, one that overturned
deeply held beliefs about blood and nurture, obligation
and love, choice and chance. It was no accident that the
United States was the crucible of this kind of adoption: in
its repudiation of the past and its confidence in social
29
engineering, adoption is quintessentially American.
Over the next hundred years, the changing social mores and
attitudes directly affected, albeit at some times in a delayed
manner, the attitude toward and support for adoption. “During
the 1910s and 1920s, adoption emerged as an ambitious new social
transaction, a legal and cultural institution that conferred kinship
30
on parents and children unrelated by blood.” Additionally, “new
adoptive famil[ies] reflected another change within American
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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culture: the ongoing transformation of middle-class family life. For
nearly a century, Americans had made marriage a more individual
affair, as young people insisted on choosing their own partners.
31
They added romantic love to duty in the marriage contract.”
This changing view of families in marriage, along with various
exposés in the 1890s and early 1900s, spurred reformers to respond
to a range of social problems—from disabilities to child
dependency—by building institutions, as opposed to supporting
32
adoption or movement within the family.
A 1909 White House Conference on the Care of Dependent
Children gathered together a new breed of child welfare workers:
“The benevolent reform of charity workers and evangelical
missions yielded to a new professionalization of reform, one that
33
appealed to the expertise of social science.” Institutional care was
34
viewed now as a last resort. A growing faith in nurture over nature
by child welfare experts looking for new solutions began to have
35
significant impact. This, along with a new attitude toward women
who were pregnant out of wedlock, again shifted the commitment
36
toward adoption. Development of the goal to keep the mother
and child together often conflicted with the values of providing
stability and security within a family setting.
This conflict
developed into observations of an illicit alternative to the
37
rehabilitative agenda of keeping mothers and children together.
As reflected in a Progressive exposé entitled The Traffic in Babies, a
1914 report by George Walker, the results of an investigation of two
Baltimore baby farms were well respected:
For a fee, they took babies off the hands of mothers
looking to save themselves from the disgrace of single
motherhood. Some also boarded pregnant women until
their babies’ births, further helping to conceal an illicit
pregnancy. The profit in such services depended on a
grisly calculus: at a time when bottle feeding was not yet a
reliable substitute for breast milk, most babies did not
survive separation from their mothers and so did not
become a financial burden for the proprietors. Only the
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
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hardiest newborns could survive a regimen that often
combined bottle feeding with poor sanitation and
negligent care. Walker’s investigation reported a death
rate of over 80 percent of all babies admitted and gave a
grim account of the mass graves to which their small
38
bodies were consigned.
There were even attitudes among some that it was “better that
[they] should die” as opined by one woman as she explained to an
investigator why she referred mothers of “illegitimate” babies to
39
such an institution.
As a result of the appalling attitudes and the exposé, views
toward adoption shifted back and forth. At the same time,
attitudes were shifting back and forth regarding marriage,
unplanned pregnancies, illegitimate children, and adoption.
“Along with Progressive reform, the developing profession of social
work helped to displace the moralism of nineteenth-century
40
evangelical reformers.” While “evangelical reformers had reached
out to the ‘fallen women’ . . . the retribution for sin was the
sentence of single motherhood. A new generation of secular
reformers was both less concerned with punishing the sinner and
more concerned about the effects of such redemption on the
41
child.”
Later social workers would endorse adoption as another
42
solution for children born out of wedlock. This was a way to give
the sexual transgressor an additional chance and also to save the
43
child from the consequences of the mother’s mistakes. Through
the time of the Second World War, the “fallen women” of the
nineteenth century had become susceptible to the intervention of
44
experts.
That resulted in a significant increase in, and
recommendation for, the stability of adoption.
III. SELECTED HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF MINNESOTA STATUTES
As with national statutory developments, Minnesota statutes
have been periodically revised to reflect the view of the day.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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45

Historically, common law adoption did not exist and was created
46
through statute. The philosophical views of society are reflected
47
in statutory change. The rights of birth parents, adoptive parents,
and children have shifted over time as those attitudes have shifted.
The earliest statutes in Minnesota dealing with adoption appear
48
to have been enacted in 1876 and reveal the views of the time. Any
inhabitant of the state could petition “the district court in the county
49
of his residence” to adopt a child. If the person petitioning was
married, it was required that the husband or wife join in the adoption
50
petition or it would not be granted. An adoption would not be
51
granted without the consent of the birth parents, if they were living.
But if no parent was living, then the next of kin could consent to the
adoption—if no next of kin was available, then the chairman of the
52
board of the county commissioners could give consent. And if the
child was “not born in lawful wedlock,” the consent only had to be
53
given by the mother. “But the court could find that the child had
been “abandoned” (although this was not defined) and obtain
consent from a guardian or the chairman of the county board so that
54
the adoption could proceed.
A child of age fourteen or over had to consent to his own
55
adoption. If there were not any parents or kin around, the court
was required to publish the notice of the hearing in a “paper of
56
general circulation,” published in the county where the petition was
57
presented, for at least three successive weeks. If the court found
that the petitioners were of suitable nature and ability to provide for,

45. See In re Jaren’s Adoption, 223 Minn. 561, 27 N.W.2d 656 (1947); WRIGHT
S. WALLING, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION
ON ADOPTION, LEGAL COMMENTS AND CONSIDERATION A VIEW FROM THE PAST 1
(1993).
46. See Joseph W. Newbold, Jurisdictional and Social Aspects of Adoption, 11
MINN. L. REV 605 (1927).
47. WALLING, supra note 45, at 1.
48. MINN. STAT. ch. 124, §§ 26–32 (1878). These sections were incorporated
from an 1876 act, “An act providing for the adoption of children,” approved February
26, 1876. 1876 Minn. Laws 107.
49. MINN. STAT. ch. 124, § 26 (1878).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 27.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 28.
56. Id. § 29.
57. Id.
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nurture, and educate the child, then a decree of adoption was issued,
ordering that the “child shall be deemed and taken to be the child of
58
the petitioner or petitioners . . . .”
After the adoption, the adopted child was to be deemed, as to
“all legal consequences and incidents,” the natural relation of
59
adoptive parents as if he had “been born to them in lawful wedlock.”
The exception to this was that, for purposes of inheritance, the
adoption itself would not “constitute such child the heir of such
60
parents or parents by adoption.” Thus, despite adoption, the child
would not automatically inherit from his adoptive parents. But the
natural parents were deprived “of all legal rights respecting the child”
and the child was “free from all obligations of maintenance and
61
obedience respecting his natural parents.”
62
In 1894, changes and additions began to occur. The court was
allowed to proceed with an adoption if “either parent” was, by reason
of having been declared insane, incapacitated from giving a
63
consent. The statutes now indicated that if a parent had lost the
care and custody of the child by judgment in a divorce, then the
consent of that non-custodial parent was not required in order to
64
proceed with an adoption. The courts were given specific authority,
if requested by the person adopting a child, to decree that the child
adopted would be the heir of the person and, in that case, that the
adopted child would inherit directly from the adopted parent “in all
65
respects as if born to said parent in lawful wedlock.” But the statutes
also said that “no person shall, by being adopted, lose his right to
66
inherit from his natural parents or kindred.”
67
Additional concepts were added in 1905.
There was an
58. Id. § 30.
59. Id. § 31.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 32.
62. WALLING, supra note 45, at 3. See also Recent Cases, Adoption-Adopted ChildRemainders-Trust Deeds, 2 MINN. L. REV. 300 (1918); Recent Cases, Adoption-Rights of
Inheritance-Second Adoption, 2 MINN. L. REV. 301 (1918); Recent Cases, AdoptionDeath of Adopted Child-Right of Natural and Adoptive Parents to Inherit, 6 MINN. L. REV.
65 (1921); Recent Cases, Adoption-Inheritance from Adopted Children-Rights of Heirs
and Next of Kin of the Adopted Parents to Inherit, 18 MINN. L. REV. 67 (1934); Recent
Cases, Adoption-Descent and Distribution-Effect of Second Adoption on Child’s Right to
Inherit from First Adoptive Parents, 26 MINN. L. REV. 114 (1942).
63. MINN. STAT. § 8017 (1894).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 8021.
66. Id. § 8023.
67. WALLING, supra note 45, at 3–4.
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indication that an adult could be adopted, where the statute said, “a
68
The status of a child for
person of full age may be adopted.”
inheritance purposes was further clarified, with the statute indicating
that “upon adoption such child shall become the legal child of the
person adopting him, and they shall become his legal parents, with all
the rights and duties between them of natural parents and legitimate
69
child.” The adopted child would inherit from his adopting parents
70
and all of the appropriate relatives.
Another section required that anyone bringing a child into the
state for purposes of adoption had to “first obtain the consent of the
state board of control, whose duty it shall be to carry out the
provisions of this section, and such person shall conform to the rules
71
of the board.”
It further required the filing of a bond whose
purpose was to guarantee that the person was not bringing in a child
who was incorrigible or unsound of mind or body, and that the
person agreed to remove the child from the state if the child became
72
a public charge. The statute required anyone bringing a child into
the state for purposes of adoption to enter into a “written contract”
with the person adopting the child, agreeing that the adoptive parent
73
would be responsible for the proper care and training of the child.
It also charged the person importing the child with the care and
supervision of the child and with visiting the child at least once a
74
year. It was a criminal violation to not follow through with these
75
requirements.
Under certain circumstances, a hospital was allowed to consent
76
to an adoption when an illegitimate child was born in that hospital.
Another section of the statute allowed the court to commit to an
orphan asylum any child under the age of sixteen who was “engaged
in a ‘mendicant occupation’ or as a gymnast, contortionist, rider, or

68. MINN. STAT. § 3612 (1905).
69. Id. § 3616.
70. Id.
71. Id. § 3617.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 3617.
75. Id. See also Recent Cases, Adoption-Specific Performance of and Contract to
Adopt, 16 MINN. L. REV. 578, 578 (1931) (citing Winkelmann v. Winkelmann, 178
N.E. 118 (Ill. 1931)); Recent Cases, Parent and Child-Specific Performance of PreAdoptive Contact in Derogation of Adoptive Parents’ Rights, 15 MINN. L. REV. 700, 719
(1930).
76. MINN. STAT. § 3619 (1905).
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acrobat, or in any indecent or immoral exhibition or vocation . . . .”
Following the shifts of societal attitudes, the 1917 statutes reflect
additional changes and expansion of the statutory statements
78
regarding adoption. There was a clear indication that upon the
filing of a petition for adoption, the court was required to notify the
79
State Board of Control.
The State Board of Control was then
required to verify all of the allegations in the petition and “to
investigate the condition and antecedents of the child for purposes of
ascertaining whether he [was] a proper subject for adoption; and to
make appropriate inquiry to determine whether the proposed foster
80
home [was] a suitable home for the child.”
(This was an early
“Home Study.”) Also for the first time, there was an indication that a
petition would not be granted until the child had lived in the home
81
for a minimum of six months.
For the first time, the law clearly gave the court the ability to
waive any investigation and waive any period of residency “upon good
cause shown” and when it was satisfied that the proposed home and
82
child were suited to one another. (Notice, at least in the statutes,
that Minnesota was still not using the term “best interests of the
child.”) In addition to not requiring the consent of anyone who lost
custody in a divorce proceeding, the statutes also stated that no
consent needed be obtained from anyone who had lost custody
83
through “the order of a juvenile court.” But the notice provision
now required (even though a consent was not required) that notice
be given to all “known kindred of the child,” and also to “a parent
who [had] lost custody of a child through divorce proceedings, and
the father of an illegitimate child who [had] acknowledged his
paternity in writing or against whom paternity has been duly
84
adjudged . . . .”
The manner of service was as directed by the
85
court.
For the first time, adoptive parents had the ability to “annul” a
86
previous adoption. If the child, within five years of his adoption,
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. § 3618.
See MINN. STAT. §§ 7151–61 (1917)); see also WALLING, supra note 45, at 5.
MINN. STAT. § 7152 (1917).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 7153.
Id. § 7155.
Id.
Id. § 7158.
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developed feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, insanity, or venereal
infection, as a result of conditions existing before the adoption, and
of which the adopting parents had no knowledge or notice, then the
87
adoption could be annulled.
Also for the first time, the county
88
attorney was required to represent the interests of the child. The
first mention of having closed files is now seen. In this statute, the
files and records of the court in these proceedings would “not be
open to inspection or copy by other persons than the parties in
interest and their attorneys . . . except upon order of the court
89
expressly permitting the same.”
In 1941, a revised, reorganized volume of Minnesota Statutes was
created, compiling previous versions of the statutes and incorporating
90
a new decimal classification system. Chapter 259 under the revision
is, to this day, the chapter containing the provisions of the adoption
91
code.
In 1951, major changes were enacted in the adoption
92
statutes. For the first time, definitions were included in the statutes,
including definitions of child, parent, petitioner, agency, and
93
contents of the petition. The statutes began using the words “best
interests of the child,” and, in particular, used that phrase with
94
respect to the authority of the court to do certain things. What we
would consider more modern language began to appear.
There was an added requirement that consent of parents of a
95
minor mother of an illegitimate child be obtained, and that an adult
96
being adopted also had to consent to the adoption. There was an
indication that after a petition had been filed and a consent had been
signed, the consent to the adoption could be withdrawn only upon
order of the court after written findings that such withdrawal was in
97
“the best interests of the child.”
More specificity was given to the written agreement to be
entered into between an agency and the biological parents regarding
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. § 7159.
90. JOHN TESSNER ET AL., MINNESOTA LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE 309 (2d ed.
2002).
91. Compare MINN. STAT. ch. 259 (1941), with MINN. STAT. ch. 259 (2006). See
also WALLING, supra note 45, at 6.
92. See 1951 Minn. Laws 769–75 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 259.21–.32 (1953)).
93. MINN. STAT. § 259.21 (1953).
94. See, e.g., id. § 259.24, subdiv. 6.
95. Id. § 259.25, subdiv. 1.
96. Id. § 259.24, subdiv. 4.
97. Id. § 259.24, subdiv. 6.
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placement of the child. This agreement was now specifically to be
executed by the director or agency, or by one of their authorized
agents, and all other necessary parties, and it had to be filed together
98
with the consent. This agreement also could not be revoked except
99
upon order of the court, based on the best interests of the child.
There was an indication that a notice of the hearing could be
waived by the person entitled to notice if that waiver was executed
100
before two competent witnesses and duly acknowledged.
That
101
waiver had to be filed with the court.
Also for the first time, all
“hearings” in adoption proceedings had to be confidential and held
102
in closed court with only certain people authorized to be present.
It was clearly directed that any order, judgment, or decree of the
103
court pursuant to the adoption provisions could be appealed. Any
person against whom the order was made or who was affected by it
104
could appeal.
Appeals were to be done in the same manner as
105
other civil appeals.
In response to the 1972 United States Supreme Court decision
106
in Stanley v. Illinois, the Minnesota Legislature passed a statute
107
regarding retention of the rights of the illegitimate father,
colloquially known as the “60/90-day statute.”
This statute
recognized that an unmarried man who fathered an illegitimate child
could have an interest in the child and some legal rights that had to
108
be protected. The statute also placed the burden upon the man to
express his desire to establish a relationship by filing an affidavit
within sixty days of the child’s placement for adoption or ninety days
109
after the child’s birth.
The automatic effect of the filing of the
affidavit was not to make the man the “legal father” or to be the
equivalent of a finding of paternity—rather, it resulted only in notice

98. Id. § 259.25, subdiv. 1.
99. Id. § 259.25, subdiv. 2.
100. Id. § 259.26, subdiv. 1 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 259.49 (2006)).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 259.31 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 259.61 (2006)).
103. Id. § 259.32 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 259.63 (2006)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
107. 1974 Minn. Laws 89–90 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 259.261 (1974)
(current version at MINN. STAT. § 259.52 (2006))).
108. See MINN. STAT. § 259.261 (1974) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 259.52
(2006)).
109. Id.
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110

to the other parent within seven days.
If, after notice to the other parent, there was no response within
sixty days, then the affidavit would constitute “conclusive evidence of
111
parenthood” for the purpose of the adoption statute.
In order to
challenge this affidavit, the birth mother or some other interested
person could deny that the man was the parent of the child and file a
petition (unspecified in nature) to challenge the notice of
112
parenthood.
In 1980, the statute was amended to allow for withdrawal of
consent within ten working days after the consent was executed and
113
acknowledged.
Notification of withdrawal of consent had to be
received by the agency to which the child had been surrendered no
later than the tenth working day after the consent was executed or
114
acknowledged.
After that, it became irrevocable except upon a
115
finding of fraud.
While other changes occurred—changes particularly procedural
in nature—the most significant addition to the statutes after 1980 and
before the 1994 major revision of the statute was the Minority Child
116
Heritage Protection Act enacted in 1983.
This law stated that
“[t]he policy of the state of Minnesota is to ensure that the best
interests of the child are met by requiring due consideration of the
child’s minority race or minority ethnic heritage in adoption
117
placements.”
International adoptions were excluded from the
requirements of this provision if “the appropriate authority in the
118
child’s country of birth [had] approved the placement.”
It was
therefore originally known as the Minnesota Minority Child
119
Heritage Protection Act.
Reference to minority heritage was
120
removed during the pendency of the litigation known as In re D.L.

110. Id. § 259.261, subdiv. 3.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 1980 Minn. Laws 778 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 259.24, subdiv. 6a
(1980)).
114. MINN. STAT. § 259.24, subdiv. 6a (1980).
115. Id.
116. 1983 Minn. Laws 1192–99 (codified at scattered sections of MINN. STAT.
chs. 257, 259, 260 (1984)).
117. MINN. STAT. § 259.255 (1984).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Timothy P. Glynn, Note, The Role of Race in Adoption Proceedings: A
Constitutional Critique of the Minnesota Preference Statute, 77 MINN. L. REV. 925, 930–31
(1993).
120. 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992); Glynn, supra note 119, at 930 n.20.
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The act set preferences, in the absence of good cause to the
121
contrary, with respect to the placement of children in adoption.
Those preferences were, in order: a relative or relatives of the child, a
family with the same racial or ethnic heritage as the child, or a family
of different racial or ethnic heritage from the child that was
knowledgeable and appreciative of the child’s racial or ethnic
122
heritage.
The child’s genetic parent or parents were allowed to
123
The child’s genetic
request that the preferences not be followed.
parent or parents were also allowed to express a preference for
placing the child in an adoptive home of the same or similar religious
background to that of the genetic parents in following the
124
preferences listed above.
Interpretation of this statute and, in
particular, the enforcement of this statute in non-infant adoptions
125
The statutes have been
has caused a great deal of litigation.
repealed in light of the Federal Multi-Ethnic Placement Act, which
126
prohibited placement based on race.
IV. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
Virtually all of the changes in the last twenty years to adoption
statutes have been the result of the new attitude supporting the
concept of “open adoption.” In that context, “[a]doption is
increasingly understood to be a dynamic, lifelong process that
entails the acknowledgment by both adoptive and birth families of
127
each other’s existence and role in the lives of adopted children.”
“‘Openness’ has become the mantra of contemporary adoption
128
policy and practice.”
This concept has pervaded virtually all
issues in the adoption field, including the rights of birth mothers,
the rights of birth fathers, the role of adoptive parents, the rights of
children, and the underlying definition of adoption itself. It is also
the fuel driving new and continuing discussions of further changes
in adoption attitudes and statutes.
121. See 1983 Minn. Laws 1197 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 260.181, subdiv. 3
(1984)); MINN. STAT. § 259.29 (1984).
122. 1983 Minn. Laws 1197.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., In re S.T. and N.T., 512 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. 1994); In re D.L., 486
N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992); In re T.L.A., 677 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
126. Multi-Ethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 4057
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 622 (1994)).
127. FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER, supra note 2, at 157.
128. Id.
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Further, “[o]pen adoption may be limited to the exchange of
information between the families at the time of placement and the
sending of an occasional photo or letter, but may in some cases be
much broader, including regular visitation by members of the birth
129
family with the adopted child long after the adoption is final.”
In this same context, there has been an evolution in the
consideration of enforceability or the recording of “openness”
agreements. They can be informal, formal, supported by written
documents or, as in Minnesota, supported by available court
130
orders. This dramatic shift in both power and attitude, resulting
from the concept of “open adoption,” has, in many people’s view,
resulted in a complete revolution of how we define and create
families.
A. The Changing Rights, Responsibilities, and Power of Birth Mothers
Although often overlooked, perhaps one of the most dramatic
shifts that has occurred in the last twenty years has been the way in
which children are “placed” for adoption. As reflected further on,
the 1994 Minnesota Legislature recognized this change with a
131
dramatic and comprehensive revision of all adoption statutes.
While there are many issues of significance, perhaps the most
dramatic change was the specific ability of birth parents to place
their children for adoption with adoptive parents they had selected,
rather than requiring that “child placing agencies” place children
with adoptive parents the agencies had selected. This was the first
significant reflection of the critical movement toward “open
132
adoptions” in Minnesota law.
While there are many reasons for this shift,
[a]mong the factors contributing to the prevalence of
open domestic adoptions is the rarely noted shift in power
from adoptive to birth parents. As the competition
among would-be adoptive parents has intensified because
129. Id.
130. See MINN. STAT. § 259.58 (2006).
131. See 1994 Minn. Laws 1877–92 (codified at MINN. STAT. ch. 259 (1994)).
132. See MINN. STAT. § 259.22 (1994). Before that time, all adoption records
and identifying information were confidential and only able to be released with a
court order. See MINN. STAT. §§ 259.46, .31 (1992). Since this confidentiality
extended to birth parents as well, and since before 1994 only licensed child
placing agencies, and not birth parents, could place children for adoption, there
was no possibility of any openness without a perceived violation of statute. See
MINN. STAT. § 259.22 (1992).
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of the steep decline since the late 1960s in the number of
healthy infants who are voluntarily relinquished for
adoption, a more distinctive “seller’s market” has
emerged. Birth parents, and especially birth mothers, are
not only choosing the individuals who will parent their
children, but often expect to retain a role in the life of the
new adoptive family. [Prospective parents] who harbor
doubts about meeting, or maintaining contact with birth
parents, may be less likely to end up with a child to
133
adopt.
Before the recognition in the statutes of the shift in the social
attitudes, no one could petition for adoption of a specific child
“unless the child sought to be adopted ha[d] been placed by the
Commissioner of Human Services, the Commissioner’s agent, or a
134
This left birth parents in a
licensed child placing agency.”
position in which the decision as to who would adopt their child
would be made by a group of social workers based on their own
prejudices, backgrounds, and histories. At times, those decisions
were made based on race, religion, income, intellect, or financial
135
ability.
In any case, some mothers described those situations as
placing their child into the “black hole” of adoption agencies with
no information available about them, the child, and no input into
136
who did the adoption.
Notwithstanding that, since at least 1951, the statutes had
specifically allowed the court to “waive the requirement” of a
child’s being placed by a licensed child-placing agency or the
137
Commissioner of Human Services.
During the 1980s and early
1990s, the practice became to request such a waiver from the court
when a suitable adoptive family was found, particularly when the
birth mother desired a particular family to adopt her child. In
recognition of the reality of the changing social situation and
attitude toward families, in 1994 the Minnesota Legislature made
138
several significant changes. Those changes included the creation
of a process known as “Direct Adoptive Placement,” allowing a
133. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Overview of Legal Status of Post-Adoption Contact
Agreements, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER, supra note 2, at 159.
134. MINN. STAT. § 259.22, subdiv. 2 (1994).
135. Brian Paul Gill, Adoption Agencies and the Search for the Ideal Family, 1918–
1965, in Adoptions in America: Historical Perspectives, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION
READER, supra note 2, at 67.
136. Statements by birth mother clients to Wright S. Walling, Esq.
137. MINN. STAT. § 259.22, subdiv. 1 (1994).
138. See source cited supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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birth mother to select adoptive parents and get pre-birth approval
of the placement of that child regardless of a lack of involvement
by a licensed child placing agency or the Commissioner of Human
139
Services.
Initially, in attempting to clarify the nature of “placement
activities,” the Legislature defined them as follows:
(1) placement;
(2) arranging or providing short-term foster care pending
an adoptive placement;
(3) facilitating placement by maintaining a list in any
form of birth parents or prospective adoptive parents;
(4) collecting health and social histories of a birth family;
(5) conducting an adoption study;
(6) witnessing consents to an adoption; or
(7) engaging in any activity listed in clauses (1) to (6) for
the purposes of fulfilling any requirements of the
140
interstate compact on the placement of children.
The Legislature then set out to define the process known as
141
“Direct Adoptive Placement” and indicated that it meant “the
placement of a child by a birth parent or legal guardian other than
an agency under the procedures for adoption authorized by
142
[Section] 259.47.”
Continuing in that direction, the Legislature authorized the
filing of an adoption petition if the child had not been placed in
conformity with the requirements of Minnesota Statutes Section
143
259.47.
It then went on to lay out a manner by which the court
could review and verify the appropriate issues in allowing a direct
144
placement by a birth parent.
More specifically, in reflecting its
desire with respect to allowing direct placement by birth parents,
the Legislature stated, “the intent of the provisions governing
direct adoptive placement is to safeguard the best interest of the
child by providing services and protections to the child, birth
parents, and adoptive parents which are consistent to those

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

MINN. STAT. § 259.21, subdiv. 10 (1994).
Id. § 259.21, subdiv. 9.
See supra text accompanying note 139.
See supra text accompanying note 139.
MINN. STAT. § 259.22, subdiv. 2(f) (1994).
See id. § 259.47.
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145

available through an agency placement.”
The Legislature went on to provide the procedure whereby the
adoptive parents—in conjunction with, and upon agreement of,
the birth mother—could request a court order allowing and
approving the placement of the child with the prospective adoptive
146
parents.
It allowed the court order to be requested up to sixty
147
days before the anticipated birth of the child.
It also laid out a
specific procedure of required affidavits and information from the
148
birth mother and adoptive parents.
This emphasis on the rights and authority of the birth mother
are also reflected in other statutory provisions. For example, the
birth parent is entitled to receive up to thirty-five hours of adoption
counseling, provided at the expense of the adoptive parent or
149
parents. Additionally, the birth parent is entitled to legal counsel
during the direct placement process, and the adoptive parents are
150
required to pay for such representation.
Further, the order “shall state that the prospective adoptive
parent’s right to custody of the child is subject to the birth parent’s
right to custody until the consents to the child’s adoption become
151
irrevocable.” Other parts of the statute require a consent form to
be signed no sooner than seventy-two hours after the birth of the
152
subject child. Even after signed consent is given, the birth mother
has an uncontrolled and free ability to withdraw that consent for
any reason for a period of ten working days after signed consent is
153
properly obtained, illustrating that the birth mother’s rights
145. Id. § 259.47, subdiv. 1. It should be noted that birth mothers and fathers
received disparate treatment, in terms of both biology and the applicable statute.
Section 257.541, subdivision 1, of the Minnesota Statutes states that “the biological
mother of a child born to a mother who is not married to the child’s father
neither when the child was born nor when the child was conceived has sole
custody of the child until paternity has been established under sections 257.51 to
257.74, or until custody is determined in a separate proceeding under section
518.156.” On the other hand, subdivisions 2 and 3 make it clear that at the time of
birth, the birth father has no automatic legal rights to custody and must
affirmatively establish both paternity and his right to visitation and custody. MINN.
STAT. § 257.541, subdivs. 2–3 (1994).
146. Id. § 259.47, subdiv. 3.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. § 259.47, subdiv. 4. The statute imposes an affirmative obligation on
the adoptive parent to inform the birth mother of her right to counseling. Id.
150. Id. § 259.47, subdiv. 5.
151. Id. § 259.47, subdiv. 3.
152. Id. § 259.47, subdiv. 7.
153. Id.
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continue to be recognized and protected beyond the scope of past
statutes and laws.
Accordingly, the concept of “open adoption” resulted in a shift
of power from adoption agencies and adoptive parents to birth
mothers, giving them complete control of the early stages of
adoption. In recognizing the importance of birth parents in the
decision-making process regarding who would actually “parent” the
child, the Legislature reflected not only the views of society, but the
reality that a child is made up as a sum of all of his or her parts, and
not just those who provide the nurture.
B. Rights of Putative Fathers—An Evolution
154

the United States Supreme Court
In Stanley v Illinois,
recognized, for the first time, the constitutional rights of putative
fathers. This decision offered putative fathers the opportunity to
155
be involved in the lives of their children.
In response to the Stanley decision, the Minnesota Legislature
156
passed a statute regarding retention of rights of fathers known as
157
This statute purported to describe the
the “60/90-day statute.”
criteria and process under which putative fathers could protect
their rights. The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that, in
158
the case of In re Paternity of J.A.V., failure by the putative father to
follow the requirement of that statute did not prohibit him from
bringing a paternity action, as long as the adoption was not
completed. The fact that a child had been placed with his or her
adoptive parents would not function as a bar to a paternity action.
As a result of this and other decisions, in its report of January of
1997, the Minnesota Supreme Court Foster Care and Adoption Task
159
Force recommended that Minnesota adopt a Putative Fathers’
Registry statute similar to that which was in existence in Illinois and

154. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
155. Id.
156. 1974 Minn. Laws 89–90 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 259.261 (1974)
(current version at MINN. STAT. § 259.52 (2006))).
157. See discussion supra Part III and accompanying text.
158. 547 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1996).
159. See SYKORA & SKOGLUND, HOUSE RESEARCH BILL SUMMARY (Mar. 10, 1997),
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/bs/97-98bs/0919a.pdf (summarizing the
task force proposals); Mary Jo Brooks Hunter, Special Report: Minnesota Supreme
Court Foster Care and Adoption Task Force, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1 (1997)
(providing the complete task force report).
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160

other states.
As with all issues relating to adoption, this and other statutes
have attempted to balance the appropriate rights of putative fathers,
adoptive parents, birth mothers, and children, within the context of
looking toward what ultimately would be deemed by society to be in
161
the child’s “best interests.” More specifically, the Legislature stated
that there should be established a Fathers’ Adoption Registry for
“determining the identity and location of a putative father interested
in a minor child who is, or expected to be, the subject of an adoption
proceeding, in order to provide notice of the adoption proceeding to
162
the putative father who is not otherwise entitled to notice . . . .”
In an attempt to balance all of the rights and interests of
putative fathers, adoptive parents, birth mothers, and children, the
legislators created a registry whereby any man interested in a
particular child, or the possibility of a child of his being adopted,
could register with the State of Minnesota on the Registry, thus
163
preventing any adoption from being done without notice to him.
Of critical importance was the ability of the putative father, who
had been with a woman and believed that pregnancy might have
164
resulted, to register at any time before the birth of the child.
More specifically, the statute states that “a putative father may
register with the Department of Health before the birth of a child
but may register no later than 30 days after the birth of the
165
child.”
In a continuing attempt to balance the rights, responsibilities
and “best interests,” the statute indicates that the failure to register,
if the father is not otherwise covered and entitled to notice under
other statutes, puts the birth father in a position of being “barred
thereafter from bringing or maintaining an action to assert any
interest in the child during the pending adoption proceedings
166
concerning the child.” Further, the father is “considered to have
167
abandoned the child” and is “considered to have waived and
160. See MINN. STAT. § 259.52 (2006) (creating the putative fathers’ adoption
registry). See also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/12/1 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2202 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.062 (West 2005).
161. See Brooks Hunter, supra note 159, at 9.
162. MINN. STAT. § 259.52, subdiv. 1(a) (2006).
163. Id.
164. Id. § 259.52, subdiv. 7.
165. Id.
166. Id. § 259.52, subdiv. 8(1).
167. Id. § 259.52, subdiv. 8(3).
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surrendered any right to notice of any hearing in any judicial
proceeding for adoption of the child, and consent of that person to
168
the adoption of the child is not required.”
More specifically, and as noted by the Minnesota Supreme
Court Foster Care and Adoption Task Force, the Minnesota
169
Registry is based on Illinois law and, to some extent, Indiana law.
168. Id. § 259.52, subdiv. 8(2).
169. The Final Report of the January 1997 Minnesota Supreme Court Foster
Care and Adoption Task Force, on pages 73–74, in response to Hisgun v. Velasco,
547 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1996), recommended that Minnesota adopt a registry
statute similar to that which was in existence in Illinois. Minnesota Statutes section
259.52 was the result of this recommendation. See MINN. STAT. § 259.52 (2006).
Other states have upheld these registries as an appropriate balancing of the rights
of putative fathers, adoptive parents, mothers, and children, even where the
mother intentionally hid the child’s existence or did not inform the putative
father of the pregnancy.
The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld a refusal to set aside a judgment in
favor of adoptive parents where the mother had not told the putative father of the
child. In re Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The Indiana Court of
Appeals concluded that “promptness is measured in terms of the baby’s life not by
the onset of father’s awareness,” and if a putative father fails to timely register,
then the State’s obligation to provide an adopted child with a permanent and
loving family is paramount. Id. at 287.
Illinois upheld its Putative Father’s Registry, which is virtually identical to
the Minnesota Registry. See In re K.J.R. & D.F.R., 687 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/12.1 (2006). In K.J.R., the mother told
the putative father he was not the father, and another man was named on the
birth certificate and consented to the adoption. K.J.R., 687 N.E.2d at 116. The
putative father argued that his failure to timely register should be excused due to
the mother’s misrepresentations. Id. at 116–18. The Illinois Court of Appeals
held that if a putative father has not acted within the 30 days after birth as
required, the child’s right to a stable environment and finality becomes
paramount, and the putative father loses all rights to intervene in or vacate
adoption proceedings. See id. at 117.
The court reasoned that even the mother’s affirmative misrepresentation
does not excuse a failure to timely register. Id. at 118. Since a putative father has
independent knowledge of the facts giving rise to his duty to register—that he had
intercourse with the mother—the possibility of parentage “is sufficient to invoke
the registration provisions” of the registry. Id. Where a putative father had
“substantial reason to suspect” he could be a father, this gave rise to the duty to
register. Id. at 119. A “lack of knowledge of pregnancy or birth is not an
acceptable reason for failure to register.” Id. at 117 (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 50/12.1(g) (West 1994). Therefore, the statute required a “positive effort”
by the putative father to pursue his rights “notwithstanding the silence, passivity, or
miscommunication” of the mother. Id. at 119 (emphasis added). But the court’s
reference to In re John Doe & Jane Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994), is misplaced. Id.
at 117–18. In John Doe, the biological mother and father planned together
throughout the pregnancy, and the father provided for the mother’s expenses. Id.
at 182. The father left the country briefly and the mother placed the child for
adoption, then told the father the child was stillborn. Id. Upon learning, fifty-
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In balancing the equities, and in conformity with other cases
around the country, the statute provides a process for a putative
father to show timely registration despite having registered later
170
than thirty days after the birth of the child.
In such a case, the
putative father can show timely registration by proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that: “(i) it was not possible for him to
register within the period of time specified . . . ; (ii) his failure to
register was through no fault of his own; and (iii) he registered
171
within ten days after it became possible for him to file.”
Thus, the responsibility for protecting the putative father’s
constitutional right to notice has shifted and is clearly placed
directly on his shoulders. The new statute also eliminated the
172
problem raised in Hisgun v. Velasco in that it not only prohibits an
untimely-registering putative father from exercising a claim for the
child in the adoption proceeding, but also prohibits him from
bringing any action to assert an interest in the child, including a
173
paternity action.
While giving the putative father essentially ten months to
register and exert his rights, the Minnesota courts have been
consistent in strictly interpreting the statutes. For example, the
thirty-day requirement has been strictly enforced against men who
are living out of state and do not know the location of the mother
174
or the date of birth of the child.
Additionally, the courts have strictly interpreted the statute to
refuse to impose on the birth mother a duty to give notice to any

seven days after the birth, that the child was alive and being adopted, the father
then began proceedings to contest that adoption. Id. Illinois law provided that a
parent was “unfit,” and therefore consent to adoption was not required, if the
parent had not shown a “reasonable degree of interest in the child within the first
30 days” of the child’s life. Id. (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1 (West
1992)). The Illinois Supreme Court held that a finding that the father failed to
show a reasonable degree of interest was not supported by the evidence, because
he had made attempts which were “either frustrated or blocked,” and that
therefore he had “had no opportunity to discharge any familial duty.” Id. (emphasis
added).
The Minnesota Legislature, in enacting the Minnesota Father’s Adoption
Registry, has balanced the rights of fathers, adoptive parents, children, and birth
mothers, and provided a clear limit on a putative father’s ability to assert an
interest in a child and disrupt a child’s placement after a certain time.
170. MINN. STAT. § 259.52, subdiv. 8 (2006).
171. Id.
172. 547 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1996).
173. MINN. STAT. § 259.52, subdiv. 8.
174. See Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 366–67 (Minn. 2002).
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man who has not registered under the registry within the required
175
thirty days after the birth time period.
Thus, again the “open adoption” concept has directly
impacted the rights of putative fathers. Further, with respect to all
of the participants, the balancing of equities in adoption statutes, as
in other contexts, has tipped toward security, stability, and
permanency for adopted children within a relatively short period of
time. This significant difference between birth parents results
from the fact that, at the time of birth, a birth mother, unmarried
at the time of birth or the time of conception, is the sole legal
176
parent and physical custodian of the child. On the other hand, a
biological father, unmarried to the biological mother at the time of
conception or the time of birth, has no legal or custodial rights to
177
the child without taking some initial action.
This has been
reflected in the application of the Fathers’ Adoption Registry to
putative fathers in the adoption context.
C. Open Adoption—The Logical Extension
It is clear that the nature and manner in which adoptions have
occurred, the issues of placement, and the rights of birth mothers
and birth fathers have been dramatically affected by the concept of
“open adoption.” The prime focus of that concept has, in fact,
been on what open adoption means, how it is implemented, and
how it has actually shifted post-adoption contact. In looking at the
question of “open adoption” more specifically, in most situations,
[a]n open adoption is one in which the birth parent(s) at
least meet the adoptive parents and may even participate
in selecting them . . . . [O]pen adoption includes the
exchange of identifying information and the making of
agreements regarding future contact and communication.
The frequency and extent of this contact and
communication will vary and may need to be renegotiated
at different times in the lives of the individuals involved,
depending upon their needs and desires and the quality
178
of the relationship that evolves . . . .
Throughout this revolution of the last twenty-five years, many
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 368.
See MINN. STAT. § 257.541, subdiv. 1 (2006).
Id. § 257.541, subdivs. 2–3.
ANNETTE BARAN & REUBEN PANNOR, Perspectives on Open Adoption, in
FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER, supra note 2, at 164–65.
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discussions have occurred about the impact of adoption on all of
the participants—birth parents, adoptive parents, and child
(commonly called the adoption triad). In particular, during the
1970s and 1980s, a number of popular misconceptions about that
179
impact were challenged.
Among those were perceptions that
“[c]ouples will not adopt children unless they are guaranteed
180
anonymity and secrecy,” that “[b]irthmothers want and need
anonymity to move forward in their lives and put the experience of
181
pregnancy and relinquishment behind them,”
and that
“[a]doptees will be confused by contact with their birthparents and
may become emotionally disturbed as a result of being aware of
182
and dealing with two mothers during their developmental years.”
And, while long-term studies of “open adoptions” have not been
completed or conclusive, it appears fairly clear that none of those
fears or misconceptions has proved either to be a barrier to
adoption or to result in a significant detriment to any of the
persons involved. In fact, just the opposite has turned out to be
true.
Within this context, several important benefits to open
adoption have been observed:
First, the birth parents assume more responsibility for the
decision to relinquish, and as full participants in the
placement and entrusting of the child to a known family,
they are better able to cope with feelings of loss,
mourning, and grief. If contact with their birthchild is
permitted, they are able to further ameliorate these
findings.
Next, adoptees’ feelings of rejection by the birthparents
also can be greatly diminished. A realistic understanding
of the problems that led to the adoptive placement
permits acceptance of the situation. The continuing link
with the birthparent dispels the notion that the children
were abandoned and forgotten. In open adoption the
need for search and reunion is eliminated. Important
background information—including genetic and medical
histories—is readily available.
Finally, for adoptive parents, knowing the birthparents of

179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 166.
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their children can prevent the fears and fantasies that
might otherwise have a negative effect on the
relationships with their adopted children. Knowing the
birthparents will enable adoptive parents to provide their
children with the background information based on first183
hand knowledge and direct contacts.
The years of experience have led most people to believe that
“open adoption” is the best approach because “[i]t minimizes
emotional and psychological harm and it allows all parties to meet
184
their continuing responsibilities to each other.”
In consideration of these attitudes, the Minnesota Supreme
Court Foster Care and Adoption Task Force in its final report of
January 1997, after studying the issue of open adoption, made
recommendations regarding creation of “Open Adoption
185
Agreements.”
Recognizing that the agreements at that point
were not enforceable, the Task Force recommended making
“Open Adoption Agreements” enforceable under certain
conditions. Reflecting its belief that there were several major
beneficial effects, the Task Force wrote:
First, making open adoption agreements enforceable may
encourage parents to voluntarily terminate their parental
rights earlier, knowing they will have some contact
(however, minimal) with their child. This will result in
quicker permanency for children. Second, making open
adoption agreements enforceable will help to protect
relationships with birth parents and birth relatives when it
186
is in the best interests of the child to do so.
Further, in making the recommendation for creating
enforceable agreement, the Task Force provided for that
enforceability as long as four main conditions were met:
1. the child must have emotional ties with the birth
parent or birth relatives;
2. the adoptive parent(s), the birth parent(s), or birth
relative(s) seeking communication, contact, or
visitation and the adoption agency (if any) must enter

183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Brooks Hunter, supra note 159, at 116–18.
Id. at 113–14.
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into a notarized written agreement before the issuance
of a final adoption decree;
3. the court must determine the agreement is in the best
interests of the child; and
4. the court must incorporate the terms of the agreement
187
into a written order.
The Task Force went on to state that it wanted to
make sure that the open adoption agreement did not
become a means whereby a birth parent or birth relative
could not undermine the adoptive parent(s)’ authority to
decide what is best for their adoptive child . . . . Among
other things, the Interagency Task Force is concerned
that making open adoption agreements legally binding
will undermine the child’s sense of security and
permanence within the adoptive family. However, the
Task Force’s reason for recommending that open
adoption agreements be made legally enforceable is to
enhance the child’s sense of security by providing a way to
preserve the child’s emotional ties with relatives and birth
188
parents if it is in the child’s best interests.
In reacting to the recommendations of the Task Force, the
189
Minnesota Legislature passed in 1997, and later amended in
190
1998, a statute on “communication or contact agreements.” This
statute provided for the ability of the parties to enter into a written
agreement that would be memorialized in a court order evidencing
an agreement for ongoing contact between the adoptive parents,
191
the child, and the birth parents or other relatives.
The purpose
of the contact agreement is to lay out the nature of contacts so that
the court can determine if the contacts are in the child’s best
192
interest.
Several significant issues are clear under the enforceable
187. Id. at 114.
188. Id. at 114–15.
189. 1997 Minn. Laws 787–88 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 259.58 (Supp. 1997)
(amended 1998, 1999, 2006)).
190. 1998 Minn. Laws 586 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 259.58 (1998) (amended
1999, 2006)).
191. MINN. STAT. § 259.58(a) (1998) (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 259.58(a) (2006)).
192. See id.
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contact agreement and contact order. The first is that the contact
193
It is enforceable in family court;
order is, in fact, enforceable.
even though the records in juvenile court are closed without a
court order, it nevertheless can be filed in the family court for
194
purposes of that enforcement.
Before going into court, all parties are required to participate
in mediation to attempt to settle any differences that might exist as
195
a result of the attempt to enforce the terms of the court order.
Of critical note, however, are the restrictions of the
enforceability. More specifically, the statute indicates that:
Failure to comply with the terms of an agreed order
regarding communication or contact that has been
entered by the court under this section is not grounds for:
(1) setting aside an adoption decree; or
(2) revocation of a written consent to an adoption after
196
that consent has been irrevocable.
Thus, the contact agreement does not provide the ability to
197
question the underlying adoption.
While it will influence
ongoing contact and communication, it neither intends nor
operates to provide a basis for questioning the ongoing legal rights
198
of the adoptive parents to parent the child.
With this restriction, the enforceable contact agreement and
order has further reflected the change in attitudes about “family”
and how families are created and defined. Notwithstanding this
statute and the current attitude in favor of contact agreements,
there have been questions recently raised by the Evan B.
199
Donaldson Institute.
In a recent report, questions were raised
regarding the efficacy of counseling on behalf of birth parents
200
leading to adoption and enforceable contact agreements.
193. Id. § 259.58(c).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. § 259.58(b).
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. For general information on the Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute,
see http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/index.php.
200. SUSAN LIVINGSTON SMITH, EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST.,
SAFEGUARDING THE RIGHTS AND WELL-BEING OF BIRTHPARENTS IN THE ADOPTION
PROCESS 31–33 (Adam Pertman ed. 2007) (writing that states vary in the quantity,
timing, and substance of counseling, which may lead to uninformed decisions in
the adoption process, thereby undermining the enforceability of contact
agreements).
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Nevertheless, the current view held by most is that open adoption is
201
the best option available for adoption.
D. Open Adoption Records—The Last Frontier
The open adoption concept, as it applies not only to adoption,
but also to the creation of families and the “rights” of persons to
know about their backgrounds and heritage, has swept through
virtually every issue. The remaining frontier of that argument has
to do with the availability of adoption records. This is a continuing
controversy, which has become hotly contested and debated in a
number of states, and it is currently a subject of continuing
discussion at the Minnesota Legislature.
From a historical
perspective,
[t]he central issue igniting the Adoption Rights
Movement in 1971 was the inability of adopted persons to
gain access to information about their birth families
contained in adoption case records.
Institutional
custodians of adoption records—courts, hospitals, and
adoption agencies—citing state statutes, some more than
a half century old, refused to divulge any family
information to adopted persons or birthparents searching
for their biological kin. As early as 1917 Minnesota
enacted legislation closing adoption records to public
inspection, and other states soon followed. By 1943,
spurred on by reformers wanting to protect the child born
out of wedlock from the stigma of illegitimacy, 23 states
had passed similar legislation sealing adoption records.
By the early 1970s, sealed records had become a standard,
if not universal, feature of the adoption process, but they
had also achieved a seeming immutability that belied the
past from which they emerged.
Not surprisingly, adoption rights activists assume that
adoption records have always been sealed and that
adoption agency officials have always been uncooperative
in providing members of the adoption triad—adoptive
parents, birthparents, and adoptive persons—with family
information . . . . But in fact, none of these assumptions is

201. See id. at 10–12, 39, 50 (suggesting that open adoption best facilitates
growth and fairness for the child, well-being for the birthparents by reducing
regret, grief, and worry, and well-being, security, and comfort for the adopting
parents).
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202

historically accurate.
Despite historical analysis reflecting that not all adoption
records have always been closed, or that all states have had closed
or sealed records, the history in Minnesota and the current
203
In fact, with
statutory view is for closed or confidential records.
the changes that have occurred in other areas of law, the sealing
and confidentiality of adoption records reflect perhaps the most
security of any records that are sealed. Even the adoptive parents
must get a court order to open their own file once it has been
sealed at the conclusion of the adoption. For this reason, as
previously noted, even the contact order required and allowed by
statute is filed in Family Court in a separate proceeding and not in
Juvenile Court, since those files and records are closed. More
specifically, Minnesota Statutes section 259.79 states as follows:
259.79 Adoption records
Subdivision 1. Content.
(a) The adoption records of the commissioner’s
agents and licensed child-placing agencies shall
contain copies of all relevant legal documents,
responsibly collected genetic, medical and social
history of the child and the child’s birth parents, the
child’s placement record, copies of all pertinent
agreements, contracts, and correspondence relevant
to the adoption, and copies of all reports and
recommendations made to the court.
(b) The commissioner of human services shall
maintain a permanent record of all adoptions
granted in district court in Minnesota regarding
children who are:
(1) under guardianship of the commissioner or
a licensed child-placing agency according to
section 260C.201, subdivision 11, or 260C.317;
(2) placed by the commissioner, commissioner’s
agent, or licensed child-placing agency after a
consent to adopt according to section 259.24 or
under an agreement conferring authority to
202. E. Wayne Carp, The Sealed Adoption Records Controversy in Historical
Perspective: The Case of the Children’s Home Society of Washington,1895–1988, J. OF SOC.
AND SOC. WELFARE vol. 19, No. 2 (1992), at 27–57 in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION
READER, supra note 2, at 126.
203. MINN. STAT. § 259.79, subdiv. 1(c) (2006).
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place for adoption according to section 259.25;
or
(3) adopted after a direct adoptive placement
approved by the district court under section
259.47.
Each record shall contain identifying information
about the child, the birth or legal parents, and
adoptive parents, including race where such data is
available. The record must also contain
(1) the date the child was legally free for
adoption;
(2) the date of the adoptive placement;
(3) the name of the placing agency;
(4) the county where the adoptive placement
occurred;
(5) the date that the petition to adopt was filed;
(6) the county where the petition to adopt was
filed;
(7) the date and county where the adoption
decree was granted.
(c)
Identifying information contained in the
adoption record shall be confidential and shall be
disclosed only pursuant to section 259.61.
Subdivision 2. Use.
Each adoption record shall constitute the permanent
record upon which court action is based and agency
services are administered.
Subdivision 3. Retention; records made public.
All adoption records shall be retained on a
permanent basis under a protected record system
which
ensures
confidentiality
and
lasting
preservation. All adoption records shall become
public records on the 100th anniversary of the
204
granting of the adoption decree.
By way of general background, in Minnesota,
[t]here is a legal presumption that court records and
records of court administrators are open to any member

204.

Id. § 259.79.
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of the public for public inspection . . . . However, court
adoption records are inaccessible to the public pursuant
to the limitations contained the in Rules of Public Access
205
to Records of the Judicial Branch.
Further, as noted above, by statute directly related to
adoptions, “[a]ll agency adoption records are confidential and
permanent and must be retained under a protected system.
Adoption records become public records on the 100th anniversary
206
of the granting of the adoption decree.”
Perhaps most controversial is the issue of retroactively opening
all of those records. That question has come under great scrutiny
in the last few years. In arguments from Oregon to Tennessee,
207
legislatures have retroactively opened the adoption records.
Those statutory decisions have withstood numerous state and
federal attacks on everything from statutory interruption to
constitutional grounds.
In addition to the changing attitudes toward “open adoption”
that have fueled this controversy, there are basic legal issues that
have been argued as well.
The continuing controversy over the confidentiality of
adoption records illustrates the inadequacy of existing
constitutional law doctrine to address issues involving
children and their families . . . . As they mature, adoptees
often seek information about their biological families,
including their original birth certificates. Constitutional
law has proved to be an awkward vehicle for articulating
and evaluating the claims of adoptees to information
about their biological families. Courts have unsuccessfully
attempted to balance the rights of adoptees against those
of their biological and adoptive parents, rather than
recognizing and attempting to mediate the overlapping
208
identity issues at stake.

205. SILBERBERG, supra note 9, at 115. See also Rules of Public Access to
Records of the Judicial Branch, R. 2 (1988) (amended 2005).
206. SILBERBERG, supra note 9, at 117–18. See also MINN. STAT. § 259.79, subdiv.
3; Tibitts v. Crossroads, Inc., 411 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987);
Minnesota DHS Reg. 9560.0180(3) (2006).
207. See, e.g., Does v. State, 993 P.2d 822 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Cawood,
134 S.W.3d 159, 167 (Tenn. 2004) (indicating that the trend is toward a policy of
openness in regard to public records, including adoption records).
208. Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case
for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150 (1999), in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN
ADOPTION READER, supra note 2, at 153.
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In efforts to open sealed records without statutory change,
cases have been brought claiming a violation of the constitutional
rights of adoptees on various grounds.
In the most widely cited case brought by adoptees (Alma
Soc’y Inc., v. Melon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979)), the
Second Circuit rejected the adoptees’ claim that their
“personhood” entitled them to open birth records. The
plaintiff adoptees argued that the New York statutes
providing for sealed adoption records violated the Due
Process Clause because the adoptees were constitutionally
entitled to the information contained in the records . . . .
The court noted that the adoptees’ request implicated the
interests of two “families,” the biological family and the
adoptive family.
Drawing on Supreme Court cases
addressing the importance of an intact family,
notwithstanding the claims of a biological father, the
Second Circuit recognized significant interests of the
adoptive families which might be “adversely affected”
through disclosure of the names of the biological
209
parents.
With the resulting failure to get records opened on court
challenge, adoptees turned their efforts to the legislative arena and
have worked hard to change the statutes that initially closed the
files. That continues to be the effort in Minnesota. Currently,
available evidence suggest[s] that open records regimes
[do not] compromise the integrity of the adoption
process. Indeed, as Professor Joan Hollinger observes,
more than 80% of the biological mothers who have
relinquished children for adoption in Michigan since
1980 have consented to the disclosure of their identity
when their children become adults . . . . Moreover,
whatever constitutionally protected interests adoptive
parents may have in controlling a child’s access to
information while the child is a minor weakens
210
considerably once a child reaches majority.
In a continuing irony,
adoption law increasingly mandates extensive disclosure
of non-identifying genetic information, while resisting the
calls for disclosure of identifying information. This
practice of fully disclosing anonymous genetic
209.
210.

Id. at 154.
Id. at 155.
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information, with corresponding secrecy of the identity of
the person, seems itself to be an example of genetic
essentialism. A primary rationale for requiring disclosure
of non-identifying genetic information is to enable
prospective adoptive parents to guard against any dangers
that might be posed through “faulty” genes. By contrast,
the purpose of disclosing the identity of biological
relatives is to aid adoptees and parents in their personal
and emotional development, though providing genetic
information may be a by-product. Knowing the identity of
her biological parents may help the adoptee in her
identity development, but is certainly not the only factor
211
in that development.
Thus, while the dam of closed records continues to be solid in
Minnesota, the oncoming tidal wave sweeping across the country—
including in Minnesota—is likely to break it down in the relatively
near future. Legal and social arguments begin to fall, and as more
study occurs regarding the whole context of openness in adoptions,
it is likely that this prohibition as well as the others discussed
previously will be left in the wake of the new attitude toward
212
adoption.
V. CONCLUSION
To say that adoption has undergone a revolution in attitude
and legal treatment in the last twenty-five years is in no way an
exaggeration. From the days when adoption agencies had a
monopoly on how children were placed and how families were
formed, we now find ourselves in a much more egalitarian situation
where decisions about forming families are left to the individuals,
rather than agencies or the government.
No longer are we in the days when an adoption agency had
birth parents coming in one door and dropping the child into a
“black hole,” while a group of social workers made decisions on
who the appropriate adoptive parents were, based on
unannounced criteria that were constantly shifting. In what now is
a much more transparent “open” process and procedure, decisions
regarding children and their best interests are primarily left to
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., H.F. 2753, 2004 Leg., 83d Sess. (Minn. 2004) (proposing to give a
person who is adopted on or after August 1, 2005, and is at least 19 years old,
access to the original birth record, on request, from the Department of Health).
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persons concerned about individual children, rather than
bureaucracy of agencies or government.
With this new “openness” come new attitudes, rights, and
responsibilities of all of the participants. The ultimate question of
what is in a child’s “best interests” is yet to be determined and will
continually change as society’s view of children and families shifts.
Nevertheless, it is axiomatic that it is difficult to envision the
situation in which too many adults “love” a child and are concerned
enough to contribute to that child’s “best interests.” The next
fifteen to twenty years will tell us, as these children grow to
maturity, what the impact of this revolution has been.
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